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The Influence of Product Involvement and Emotion on short term product demand Forecasting

Abstract: Sales forecasters in industries like fast–fashion face challenges posed by short sales time series that are highly volatile. Computers can produce statistical forecasts, but these are often judgmentally adjusted to take into account factors such as market intelligence. We explore the role of two potential influences on these adjustments: the forecaster’s involvement with the product category and their emotional reaction to particular products. Two forecasting experiments were conducted using data from a major Italian leather fashion goods producer. The participants’ judgmental adjustments tended to lower the accuracy of forecasts but this was exacerbated when participants had strong preferences for particular products. This appeared to result from a false consensus effect. The most accurate forecasts were made when participants had no knowledge of the product and only received time series information High involvement with the product category also led to greater accuracy. 
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1.	Introduction
Accurate demand forecasting for products is particularly critical in a number of industries characterized by strong time-based competition (Blackburn, 2012; Wallace and Choi, 2011; Blackburn, 1991; Stalk and Hout, 1990). However, managers who operate in sectors such as consumer electronics or fashion face the challenge of predicting future sales under conditions where there is extremely high product variety, significant demand variability and short demand histories (Thomassey, 2014; Fang et al., 2013; De Toni and Meneghetti, 2000; Forza and Vinelli, 2000). Accuracy requires forecasters who are able to combine this data, and any available statistical forecasts, with their knowledge of the product and the market (Seifert et al., 2015). This is particularly the case in volatile markets, where the predictability of future sales is low and where analytical forecasting models based on the extrapolation of time series can be highly inaccurate, especially given that demand histories are short (Thomassey, 2014).
Even when forecasters have expertise relating to their market, their forecasts are likely to be subject to a range of cognitive and motivational biases (Bert, 2016; Lawrence et al., 2006). In new product forecasting, for example, it is known that involvement in the development of the product can lead to wishful thinking and the selective processing of information to confirm that the product will be a success. The resulting forecasts suffer from optimism bias (Tyebjee, 1987). In sectors like the fashion industry, where products are particularly likely to trigger emotional reactions, demand forecasts may suffer from similar biases. In this paper, we present the results of two experiments that were designed to find whether the accuracy of short-term demand forecasts is influenced by the level of involvement of the forecasters with the product category and also by their personal emotion-based preferences for products within that category. We first review the literature to outline the characteristics that are peculiar to the forecasting process in the fashion industry, and to identify the relevant psychological factors which can influence the accuracy of judgmental adjustments to forecasts. Then we describe the experiments, before presenting the results and conclusions.
2.	Review of the Relevant Literature
2.1 Forecasting in the fashion industry
The forecasting process in many fashion industries - and in particular the textile-apparel sector- is characterized by a number of features that can make it especially challenging. As highlighted by Thomassey (2014), these features include strong seasonal patterns, very short product life-cycles, coupled with a huge product variety, and short planning horizons (generally a few weeks) to manage replenishments of stocks at retail outlets. In addition, several exogenous variables, some of which cannot be directly controlled by manufacturing companies, can have a strong influence on sales. These include macro-economic conditions, marketing strategies, retailing strategies and fashion trends. As a result of these factors, coupled with the absence of long sales time-series for most products, the applicability of traditional forecasting techniques, such as exponential smoothing or regression models, is limited (Thomassey, 2014; Nenni et al., 2013; Sichel, 2008). This is to be contrasted with forecasting for “basic” fashion products, which are characterized by long life-cycles, lack of seasonality and low fluctuations, as men’s shirts. Here approaches such as neural networks, extreme learning machine algorithms and fuzzy inference systems have proved to be effective (Choi et al, 2014; Thomassey, 2014; Au et al., 2008; Sun et al., 2008).
For “non-basic” products, the adoption of standard software systems to support the forecasting process is rather uncommon because of their low accuracy. Instead, it is quite common for fashion companies to develop their own processes, centred largely on their practitioners’ experience, in the hope that these will lead to low forecast errors and the associated benefits of reduced inventories and infrequent store-level stock-outs (Sichel, 2008). One approach involves providing practitioners with a statistical forecast of the demand for their product. Often these forecasts are based simply on extrapolations of past sales patterns. It is therefore common practice, both in fashion and other industries, for practitioners to apply judgmental adjustments to these forecasts, ostensibly to take into account market intelligence and other contextual information that has not been allowed for in the statistical algorithm (Fildes et al., 2009, Davydenko and Fildes, 2014). When this contextual information is reliable and relates to events that will have a significant effect on sales, the adjustment can improve forecast accuracy (Sanders and Ritzman, 2001). For example, in a laboratory study, Lim and O’Connor (1996) found that adjustments based on reliable contextual information led to more accurate forecasts, while Edmundson et al. (1988) highlighted the positive impact of specific product information on the accuracy of judgmental sales forecasts. In the case of fashion products with short time series, experimental evidence suggests that the provision of contextual information can positively influence forecast accuracy when a non-linear relationship between predictor variables and sales is observed (Seifert et al., 2015). It has also been demonstrated that, while the use of Point-of-Sales (POS) data from local stores is crucial to predicting future sales, the value of this type of data is enhanced when it is coupled with available qualitative information. This can include customers’ opinions collected by shop assistants or through virtual communities and social networks (Belvedere and Stabilini, 2014; Sull, 2010; Sull and Turconi, 2008). These kinds of approaches can enhance “market sensitivity” –that is, the ability to effectively and efficiently interpret market trends - allowing the company to identify, produce and deliver those items that enjoy a better market potential (Christopher, 2000). 
However, although leveraging practitioners’ experience and intuition can result in favourable outcomes in highly unpredictable environments, it can also pose some risks for companies, since judgmental interventions can be strongly influenced by cognitive biases. For example, studies have found that the benefits obtained from judgmental adjustments to statistical forecasts are often reduced because managers falsely see systematic patterns in the noise in time series and make gratuitous adjustments to reliable forecasts (O’Connor et al., 1993). People also tend to use contextual information inconsistently or inefficiently. In particular, they may over weight recent information or information that is more salient (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). For example, when determining the market potential of a new fashion product, managers may base their estimate on an analogy –that is they may take a similar product, launched in the past, as a reference and then adjust its sales on the basis of contextual information relevant to the new product (Abernathy et al., 1999). In doing so, they can be over influenced by those cases that can be most easily retrieved from memory (Goodwin et. al, 2014; Lovallo et al., 2012; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Even expertise is no guarantee of accurate forecasts. Experts may have closed mind-sets, so that they are impervious to information that disconfirms their beliefs, and they may exhibit overconfidence (Tetlock, 2005).
2.2 Product involvement, emotion and moods in forecasting
Surprisingly, few studies have addressed the effect of product involvement and emotion on judgmental adjustments to forecasts –factors that may be particularly important when forecasting sales in the fashion industry. This is despite the fact that the Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman has pointed out that “emotion now looms much larger in our understanding of intuitive judgments and choices than it did in the past” (Kahneman, 2011, p.12). For product involvement we adopt the definition proposed by Zaichkowsky (1985) that involvement is: “A person’s perceived relevance of the object based on inherent needs, values, and interests”. In forecasting it seems reasonable to expect that involvement in a given product category will be associated with interest in that category and hence will increase the attention which people pay towards the forecasting task. For example, Celsi and Olson (1988) demonstrated that “felt” involvement in a specific situation is a major driver of the attention process. This increased attention, in turn, might lead to a deeper understanding of the sales dynamics peculiar to that product category. While consumers may have a different perspective on involvement than managers making forecasts for products, it seems reasonable to expect that involvement of managers in different product categories will vary -with implications for the attention that they pay to the forecasting task.
By emotional reaction we refer to the positive or negative feelings that a person may have for a product. However, one problem evident in much of the psychology literature is that terms like ‘emotion’, ‘mood’ and ‘affect’ have often been used interchangeably or without a clear definition of their meanings (Batson et al., 1992). Recently, Ekkekakis (2012) has provided a useful classification. A core affect is defined as a “neurophysiological state consciously accessible as a feeling”. Pleasure and displeasure are examples of core affects. Ekkekakis adopts Russell and Barrett’s definition of an emotion as “a complex set of interrelated sub-events concerned with a specific object such as a person, object or thing…” (Russell and Barrett, 1999). Components of emotions include core affects (e.g. an object may arouse feelings of pleasure), the direction of attention to the stimulus that is eliciting the emotion, and an assessment of what the stimulus means and what its implications might be. Thus, emotions are stimulated by specific phenomena and may be evoked instantaneously. In contrast, moods have causes that are less easy to pinpoint, tend to be longer lasting than emotions and they are not focused on particular objects.
In many practical situations forecasters may produce a whole sequence of forecasts for different products in a single session (Fildes et al., 2009). While the forecaster’s mood during the session may have a global influence on the quality of all their forecasts (Kahneman, 2011, Isen, 2001, Estrada et al., 1997, Lim et al., 1998, Jain et al., 2013), we are interested here in the effect of their emotional reactions to specific products. Hence even though a particular mood may prevail throughout the entire forecasting session, different emotional reactions may lead to variation in the quality of forecasts for different products. 
There is evidence to suggest that an emotional reaction which takes the form of liking or disliking an object may reduce the quality of judgments. Kahneman (2011, p.12) refers to the affect heuristic “where judgments and decisions are guided directly by feelings of liking or disliking, with little deliberation or reasoning”. The heuristic simplifies the world by allowing one to focus on either the benefits or the drawbacks of a course of action, thereby avoiding the need to make difficult trade-offs between the two. For example, positive and negative feelings about different technologies can influence people’s assessment of the risks and benefits associated with them (Slovic et al., 2002). 
When assessing emotional reactions to products it is known that ‘liked’ products tend to be perceived as having few, if any, attributes that are disliked (Fischer et al., 2000). This can lead to a false consensus bias where people wrongly think that others share their own preferences because it is difficult to imagine why others would dislike a product (Ross et al., 1977). Clearly, such a bias would tend to lead to overestimation of sales for products that a forecaster likes. In contrast, disliked alternatives tend to be perceived as having a mixture of negative and positively regarded attributes (Gershoff et al., 2007a). This means that, even when you dislike a product, it is relatively easy to think of positive aspects that may cause others to like it, or have a neutral view of it so any false consensus bias will be less powerful (Gershoff et al. 2007b). Thus if you dislike a product your forecasts of its sales are likely to be more realistic.
In summary, the literature suggests that involvement with a product category is likely to increase a person’s engagement in the task of forecasting sales for a product belonging to that category. However, a positive emotional reaction to the product may lead to an optimism bias because only positive factors associated with the product are perceived and this may lead to a false consensus bias. On this basis, we arrive at the following hypotheses.
H1: Greater involvement in a product category is associated with more accurate judgmentally adjusted sales forecasts for products in that category.
H2: When a forecaster likes a product, their judgmentally adjusted forecasts will be less accurate than in cases where a product is disliked.

2.3 Sequence of information provision
One factor that may moderate the effect of emotions when managers apply adjustments to statistical forecasts is the sequence in which they receive information about the product. It seems reasonable to expect that time series data and statistical forecasts will have less influence on emotions than contextual information. One mechanism that people may use when combining the two forms of information is called anchoring-and-adjustment (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). This involves making estimates by starting with an initial value (the “anchor”), which is then “adjusted” to obtain the final estimate. Typical anchors might be the most recent sales figure (Bolger and Harvey, 1993), the statistical forecasts (Goodwin, 2005) or, in new product forecasting -as in the fashion industry- the sales of a similar product previously launched (Abernathy et al., 1999). A key aspect of anchoring and adjustment is that the anchor carries undue weight in the assessment process so that adjustments from it are often too small. An implication of this is that providing people with a quantitative value in the initial phases of their forecasting process can heavily influence their subsequent judgment. Judgments are therefore likely to be sensitive to the sequence in which information becomes available. This raises the possibility that asking managers to adjust a statistical forecast based only on time series information, and before contextual information is revealed to them, will lead to anchoring on this initial forecast and hence a reduction in the effect of the emotion-arousing contextual information. 
There is some evidence to support this possibility. For example, Bergenstrom and Sherr (2003) showed that the sequence with which information is provided can affect final judgments. They analysed a number of medical decisions and found out that the order of presentation of verbal and numerical information influenced the final estimates of probabilities, in some cases. In addition, Epley and Gilovich (2004) showed that adjustments tend to be lower when they are made from a self-generated anchor, which would be the case with managers’ initial forecasts.
However, there are also factors that may limit the moderating effect of providing ‘emotionally-neutral’ data to inform the initial forecast. Potential anchors tend to carry less weight when numeric information is competing with non-quantitative information, particularly where this has an anecdotal or narrative form. A large literature exists showing that people tend to underweight statistical base rates in favour of more “colourful” stories, explanations or rumours even when this information is unreliable (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). This tendency to discount statistical forecasts can be reinforced by the “narrative fallacy” (Taleb, 2007), where people convince themselves that they have explanations to account for past movements in sales graphs, when in reality these movements are merely manifestations of noise.
Even if the availability of qualitative and contextual information can determine such phenomena as the “narrative fallacy”, the effect of emotions and involvement can be mitigated if the forecaster anchors on an initial statistical forecast. Thus, for instance, when there is a negative emotional reaction, forecasts may be more realistic because false consensus bias is likely to be less prevalent. On this basis, we arrive at the following hypothesis.
H3: For products that invoke emotional reactions the accuracy of judgmentally adjusted forecasts will be higher when an initial forecast is produced based only on time series information (i.e. without knowledge of the nature of the product).

To test these hypotheses two experiments were carried out which attempted, as far as possible, to replicate a typical demand forecasting situation in which the forecaster is provided with a statistical forecast of the sales of a product, together with a graph of the product’s sales history to date. The forecasters can then use their judgment to adjust the statistical forecast if they think this will improve its accuracy. We obtained, from a leading Italian producer of leather fashion goods, the actual sales data for ten handbags for the first 10 weeks after the launch of these products. For each handbag, participants were supplied with the first 9 weeks sales figures and asked to forecast sales for week 10. The ten handbags were selected by the company among the best selling items of the latest collections. They showed different demand patterns, in some cases characterized by a decreasing trend, in some others by an increasing one.
3.	Experiment 1
3.1 Implementation
The first experiment involved 166 participants who were taking an undergraduate course in technology and operations management. Although the participants were not practising managers, several studies have shown that the judgments of business students in laboratory experiments, such as the one described here, are good proxies for those of managers (Bolton et al., 2012; Liyanarachchi and Milne, 2005; Remus, 1986). The laboratory environment also enables the research questions to be examined in a controlled way, free from extraneous factors such as company politics or pressures from senior management to provide forecasts that they find acceptable. 
The participants were randomly allocated to two groups. Those in the ‘Informed Before’ group (n=78) were shown the handbags before making their forecasts. Those in the ‘Informed After’ group (n=88) were shown the handbags, only after making their forecasts. They were then able to adjust their initial forecasts. For each product all participants saw a table showing the number of handbags sold for the first nine weeks after launch and a graph displaying these sales together with a trend line, fitted using least squares. This line was extrapolated to produce a statistical forecast of the sales in week 10 (see figure 1 for an exemplar series). For all products, the data was normalized by setting sales in week 1 at 100. The normalized actual sales in week 10 were used to measure the accuracy of the forecasts and these were not displayed to participants at any stage. The sequence of the 10 handbags was the same for the two groups. The participants were told that the top 5% of performers would be rewarded with a 50 euro voucher for the university book shop. 
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
To carry out this experiment, we produced a web-based questionnaire, whose first section was aimed at obtaining general information about the participant (gender and age) and their degree of knowledge of and professional experience in forecasting, measured on a 1 to 7 scale (1 being “no knowledge” or “no professional experience”). After the handbag was shown to participants they were asked to indicate on a 1 to 7 scale the extent to which they liked or disliked it (1 = don’t like, 4 = neutral, 7 = like). They were then asked to identify the name of the brand. 
The final section of the questionnaire was designed to measure the participant’s level of involvement with the product category. They were first asked how many handbags they had bought in the last 12 months and how many they would buy per year if they had no financial constraints. Involvement was then also assessed through the scale proposed by Zaichkowsky (1985), which consists of twenty bipolar items, each measured on a 1 to 7 Likert scale (e.g. “the product category is:  unexciting (1), exciting (7)”). The sum of the responses, which can range for 20 to 140, is intended to capture the extent of a person’s involvement. This measurement instrument was considered to be appropriate since it has been found to be positively related to customer’s interest in gathering information about the product category. In our study this interest was expected to drive greater engagement with the forecasting task.
3.2  Results
Table 1 gives details of the participants in the two groups together with their self-reported mean levels of knowledge and professional experience related to sales forecasting. The table also shows that there is little difference in the mean involvement score of the groups. The product involvement score was not significantly correlated with the number of products bought in the last year (r =0.023) or the number of purchases the participants said they would make in the coming year if they had no financial constraints (r = 0.106). There was a significant, albeit moderate, correlation between gender and the product involvement score with females tending to have higher scores (r= 0.497, p <0.001).
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
A number of measures exist to measure forecast accuracy. Recently Davydenko and Fildes (2013) have suggested that the relative absolute error (RAE) is appropriate when assessing the accuracy of judgmental adjustments to statistical forecasts. The RAE is given as:
RAE =  |Actual – Adjusted forecast|/|Actual –Statistical forecast|
By the end of the experiment all participants had seen the nine weeks sales data, the statistical forecast and the handbags. To assess the factors that determined the accuracy of their forecasts when they were in possession of all of this information, a separate model was obtained for the “Informed before” and “Informed after” groups with the RAE as the dependent variable. In the case of the “Informed after” group this was the RAE based on their final forecasts. The models had the following four explanatory variables: i) whether the product was identified correctly by the participant (where: 1 = Yes and 0 = No), ii) the extent to which they indicated that they liked the product (this was treated as a categorical variable to allow any non-linear association between accuracy and the extent to which the product was liked to be detected), iii) their product category involvement score and iv) the product (this was a categorical variable). The last variable was included in the model to allow the effect of the other variables to be estimated once the variation in accuracy explained by the different products had been taken into account. Because the first two independent variables involved repeated measures for each participant, and because the distribution of RAEs was highly skewed (see the box plots in Figure 2), the model was fitted using the method of generalized estimation equations (GEEs) with a gamma distribution assumed for the dependent variable and a log link function. In a very small number of cases the RAE was zero because the participant made a perfectly accurate forecast. This would be incompatible with a gamma distribution so 0.00001 was added to the RAE in these cases. Fitting the model to data where a 5% trimming had been applied to the RAEs led to essentially the same results. Pairwise correlations between the independent variables were low, between -0.25 and 0.21, suggesting that collinearity was not a problem (in these correlations the like score was treated as a continuous variable and the product variables were excluded). 
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Table 2 shows the results of the analysis. Significant differences in the RAE were found between the ten products but these results are not shown for brevity. The model assumed an independent working correlation matrix structure. However, the results were found to be very similar when other structures (exchangeable and unstructured) were assumed. 
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Because a log link function was used, the coefficients show the estimated multiplicative effect on the RAE if all other variables are held constant. Thus a coefficient above 1 indicates that an increase in the variable will be associated with an increase in the RAE and vice versa. In the “Informed Before” group, each one point increase in the category involvement score reduced the RAE on average to 99.4% of its original value % (i.e. e-0.006), an effect which is statistically significant. Similarly, in the same group, assigning a like score of 2 to a product was associated with an RAE that was on average 27.6% less (i.e. 1- e-0.276) than that associated with a like score of 7. The ability to identify the brand of the product was not significantly associated with accuracy. When participants indicated a like score of between 2 and 5 this was associated with a significantly smaller average RAE. However, this was not the case where a product was strongly disliked (i.e. where the score was 1), even though this evidence is not statistically significant. Hence there was partial support for H1 and strong support for H2.
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Generally, the participants’ adjustments damaged forecast accuracy. The median RAE was 1.24 showing that typically the error of their adjusted forecasts was 24% higher than that of the provided statistical forecasts. Figure 3 shows the relationship between the mean percentage adjustments to the statistical forecasts and the ‘like score’ for the ‘informed before’ group. There was a general propensity to reduce the statistical forecasts. Eight of the ten products had an upward trend in sales over the ten weeks following launch and a tendency for judgmental forecasters to predict damped upward trends has been widely reported in the literature. This may be due to anchoring on, and under adjusting from, the last observation (Bolger and Harvey, 1993), the implied constraint suggested by the upper boundary of the sales graph or a belief, based on experience, that sales cannot continue growing forever at a constant rate and early growth must gradually slow down (Lawrence and Makridakis, 1989). Generally, the more a product was disliked the greater the downward adjustment. In this case, the statistical forecasts were typically too high -on average they needed a downward adjustment of 24.5% (though the required adjustments ranged from -200.8% to +34.7%). However, the general worsening of the RAEs as a result of adjustment reflected a failure to match the adjustments that were made to the ones that were required for each series.
Recall that H3 assumed that any biases resulting from forecasters liking a product would be reduced if they made a forecast based only on time series information first. The idea was that they would anchor on their initial forecasts, thereby mitigating any biases resulting from their subsequent positive emotional response to the product. Table 2 indicates that for participants in the “Informed after” group the extent to which a product was liked had no association with the accuracy of their final forecasts. Only 27.5% of this group’s forecasts were further adjusted when the handbags were revealed. Participants who strongly liked or disliked a product made average adjustments that were larger than those who had other levels of preference (see Figure 4), but these adjustments were not associated with greater or less accuracy than those made when other preference levels applied. In most cases, participants preferred to stay with the forecasts they had made based only on time series information and it appears that they were right to do so. On average, the forecasts made before the bags were revealed were significantly more accurate than those made after they were informed about the products. A Wilcoxon signed ranks test comparing each participant’s median RAE indicated that this was higher for the later forecasts (p=0.021, two tail), though, given the relative infrequency of adjustments, the median increase in the RAE was only 0.03. Moreover, the initial forecasts of the “Informed after” group that were based only on time series information were significantly more accurate than those of the “informed before” group who knew the details of the products when making their forecasts. A Mann-Whitney test comparing the median RAE of two groups had a p-value of 0.034, two tail (the median difference was 0.112). All of this suggests that providing information about the product and asking for an assessment of how much the product was liked served only to damage forecast accuracy. For the “informed after” group the damage was sufficient to nullify the relative accuracy of their initial, time-series based forecasts. A Mann-Whitney test comparing the median RAEs of the “informed before” group with the median RAE of the final forecast of the “informed after” group had a p-value of 0.10, two-tail. This provides only weak support for H3. Thus, although the strategy of providing product information after an initial forecast had been made discouraged adjustments, the subsequent adjustments that were made were still damaging enough to largely cancel out the strategy’s effectiveness. 
4.	Experiment 2
4.1 Implementation
Experiment 1 raised a number of issues. First, there was a danger that the results were distorted by a confounding of the extent to which a product was liked and the demand pattern of particular products. For example, if products with harder-to-forecast series tended to be liked more than those with easier-to-forecast series the association between ‘liking’ and accuracy could be spurious. Second, the results did not control for the mood of the participant at the time the forecast were made. Mood could add noise to the measurements, hence mask the effect of medium levels of emotion on forecast accuracy. Third, participants were nor asked why they liked the bags. Getting them to reflect on the features that they liked and disliked might lead to more deliberative reasoning, enabling them to imagine why a product that they liked or disliked could be seen differently by other potential consumers, thereby counteracting false-consensus bias.
To take into account these issues the task in Experiment 2 was almost identical to that carried out by the “Informed before” group in experiment 1. However, in this experiment the participants were asked to rate their current mood on three 1 to 5 scales (happy to sad, pleased to annoyed and satisfied to dissatisfied –the mood score was obtained by summing the three ratings), following the procedure used by Raghunathan and Irwin (2001). They were also asked to assess their satisfaction with each bag on a 1 to 7 scale for ten attributes, including the bag’s size, trendiness, manufacturing quality and versatility. The selection of these attributes was based on studies by Griffin and Hauser (1993) and Matzler and Hinterhuber (1998). 
4.2  Results
Forty-eight MSc students who were attending the Supply Chain Management course took part in the experiment. Table 3 reports their details together with their self-reported mean levels of knowledge and professional experience related to sales forecasting. There was a significant difference between genders as far as the product involvement score, with females tending to have a higher mean score (equal to 109.2 for females and 85.5 for males, p <0.001). The preferences of the participants for the different bags differed considerably from those who took part in experiment 1. For example, nearly 23% of people gave bag 9 the maximum ‘like score’ of 7 in the first experiment. No one in the second experiment gave it this score. Similarly, nearly 29% of people gave bag 2 a score of 1 in the first experiment. Only 6.25% gave it this score in the second experiment. Nearly 46% of people in the second experiment very strongly disliked bag 10. Only 13% gave it this score in experiment 1. This allays concerns that demand time-series patterns might be confounded with product preferences.
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In general, the participants’ adjustments reduced the accuracy of the statistical forecasts: the median RAE was 1.19. As in Experiment 1 the method of generalized estimation equations with a gamma distribution assumed for the dependent variable, RAE, and a log link function was applied to the data. The explanatory variables were the same as those in the models for experiment 1 but they also included the aggregate mood score. The correlations between these variables had a maximum absolute value of only 0.23, suggesting that their effects could be assessed independently. As before, fitting the model to data where a 5% trim had been applied to the RAEs did not change the key findings. Table 4 shows the results. It can be seen that the coefficient for the mood score was not significant. Unlike experiment 1 the ability to identify the correct brand was significantly associated with accuracy –those who could correctly identify the brand tended to produce less accurate forecasts. However, as was the case for the “Informed before” group in experiment 1, those who had either a strong or extreme liking for a product (i.e. with like score of 6 or 7) tended to produce significantly less accurate forecasts than those expressing other levels of preference. The size of the coefficients for the different levels of liking suggest that typically the most accurate forecasts were obtained by those who disliked a product. In addition, unlike experiment 1, an extreme disliking of the product (a like score of 1) was associated with significantly more accurate forecasts than cases where there was an extreme liking for a product. 
The absolute values of the coefficients for the like scores are much larger in experiment 2 suggesting that this differences in accuracy associated with liking or disliking a product are greater. It may be that the requirement to rate one’s satisfaction for the different attributes of the products intensified the influence of product preference on the forecasts. This is reflected in the mean percentage adjustments shown in Figure 5 where the underlying slope of the graph is greater than that seen in Figure 3. In line with Experiment 1, higher product involvement scores were associated with more accurate forecasts. Overall the results provide strong support for H1 and H2. 
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5.	Discussion and conclusions
The results of our studies suggest that a strong positive emotional reaction to products is likely to lead people to make damaging judgmental adjustment to statistical forecasts. While the participants’ adjustments in general led to a deterioration in accuracy, forecasts made by the participants who had only access to time series information and were unaware of the product were significantly more accurate. This contrasts with earlier findings in the literature that the provision of product specific information enhances the accuracy of judgmental forecasts (Edmundson et al, 1988). It suggests that when products, such as fashion goods, generate strong emotional reactions the possession of product specific information is counterproductive. In these cases it seems likely that increased forecast errors will result from false-consensus bias because people think that their own strong preferences will be shared by others and hence result in high sales. This bias can be exacerbated by asking people to focus on their own position (Marks and Miller, 1987) and the larger effect sizes found in experiment 2 may have resulted from asking them to deliberate on their levels of satisfaction with the specific attributes of the products. Rather than encouraging them to adopt a broader perspective by considering both positive and negative aspects of the handbags, this process appears to have intensified their belief that their own preferences will be shared widely (Kahneman 2011). The general tendency of those who disliked a product to make more accurate forecasts than those who liked it is consistent with findings in the psychology literature that false consensus bias is weaker for products that are disliked.
As hypothesised, high involvement with the product category was associated with greater accuracy in both experiments. It is likely that interest in a product category will lead to greater attention and commitment to the task, but it is unclear exactly how this translated directly into improved accuracy. It may be that the participants were motivated to spend more effort considering the available information; indeed patterns of past sales may have genuinely had some interest for them when they had high involvement with a product category. The willingness to apply greater effort to a task is likely to be associated with analytic (system 2) as opposed to intuitive (system 1) thinking, thereby reducing the influence of biases associated with intuition (Kahneman, 2011; Moritz et al. 2011). This may have accounted for the greater accuracy, but further research, tracing the process of arriving at forecasts, would be needed to confirm this.
The consistency of the main results across the two experiments suggest that our findings are robust. However, there were some differences. The ability to identify the product brand was significantly associated with lower levels of accuracy in experiment 2, but not in experiment 1. Similarly, an extreme disliking of the product was associated with greater accuracy than a strong or extreme liking in Experiment 2, but not for the “Informed before” group in experiment 1.  It is unclear why these differences occurred but it is notable that the median product involvement score of participants in experiment 2 was significantly higher than that for experiment 1 (Mann-Whitney test, p =0.034, two tail).
The strategy of delaying information about the product in the hope that an anchoring bias would counteract subsequent enthusiastic upwards adjustments of forecasts by those who liked the product had only moderate success. It did restrict the frequency with which further damaging adjustments were made to the forecasts when the new information was presented, but this was not sufficient to significantly improve accuracy over the “Informed before” group in experiment 1. It shows that the anchoring and adjustment heuristic is by no means ubiquitous and that “dull” numbers (in this case the information in the chart) cannot be guaranteed to act as an anchor when colourful and attention-grabbing qualitative information invokes strong preferences for a product. Future research could establish whether other mitigation strategies are more successful. For example, Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2011) examined the role of emotion regulation strategies employed by financial traders. They found that traders who employed antecedent-focused emotional regulation strategies –which seek to change emotions before emotional responses have been triggered-  achieved a higher level of performance than those who employed strategies which were aimed at modifying behaviour and the expression of emotions once the emotional response had already been stimulated.
There are a number of limitations to our study. Further research will be needed to establish the extent to which managers’ judgments replicate those of the participants in this experiment. Managers might be more experienced in the forecasting task and hence may have learned to perform the task better, and with less emotional involvement, though there is currently no evidence from the field that experience improves accuracy. Also we did not consider personality factors, such as conscientiousness, which could mediate some of the associations we have reported. On the plus side, our use of real short time series enhanced the ecological validity of the experiment. Our focus was on products with short life-cycles so our use of trend-based forecasting methods was also probably more appropriate than exponential smoothing-based methods which are widely used in supply chain companies to produce forecasts for long established product lines. Furthermore, within the category of products with a short life-cycle, we focused on one specific product type (i.e. handbags). It would be useful to replicate the study with other items (i.e. from the consumer electronics industry) that pose similar challenges in the forecasting process.
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Mean knowledge of sales forecasting: 1= No knowledge, 7 = expert knowledge	2.83	2.50





















n = 780 forecasts for the “Informed before group” and 779 for the “Informed after” group





Table 3 – Background information on participants in Experiment 2
Mean Age	24.0
Mean knowledge of sales forecasting: 1= No knowledge, 7 = expert knowledge	3.23






















n = 480 forecasts
$  For the ‘Like product score’  the results are relative to a score of 7
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